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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

12789

RONDO H. EASTMOND,
\
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decree entered on December
10, 1971, committing appellant to the Utah State Industrial School as provided by law.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant, a minor, was tried in the Third Juvenile
District Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Judge Paul C. Keller, presiding. Appellant
was found guilty of burglary and a decree was entered
committing appellant to the Utah State Industrial School.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decree entered by the
Third District Juvenile Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1971, at
approximately 3: 00 a.m., Richard Murdock, a police offi.
cer for Payson City, Utah, on duty at that time, observed
the lights of a car flash on and the car pull away from the
Nebo Medical Clinic in Payson. The officer followed and
stopped the car after 4 or 5 blocks and found it to be a
1964 blue and white Ford. The officer requested identification from each of the three occupants and found that
Rondo
was tne person seated m tne center
front of the stopped car, and that all three
were from Orem, Utah. The officer accepted the explanation of the occupants as to why they were in Payson
and allowed them to proceed. He then continued his
patrol duties and proceeded to make security checks of
commercial buildings in the area. Within a few minutes
he discovered a broken window and an unlocked door at
the Nebo Medical Clinic. Officer Murdock then radioed
a request to have the 1964 Ford car stopped and caused
notice to be given to Dr. l\1angelson whose office had
been broken into at the Nebo Clinic.
Officer Larry Withers of the Provo City Police De·
partment stopped the 1964 Ford as it left the freeway at
Provo. The occupants were ordered out of the car and
frisked. A few moments later, Officer Murdock arrived
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from Payson. The driver of the vehicl:>, an adult, was advised that he was under arrest.
Office' T\/lu:-dock then loofred into the 1964 Ford and saw
on:> flashlight on the seat and another on the floorboard
of the driver's side. He opened the door on the passenger
side and observed a small black leather bag protruding
from under the car seat and containing a medical instrument. Also found in plain view was a brown plastic bottle
with the letters "alcohol" printed thereon of a type ordinarily used in doctors' offices. One of the flashlights and
the black bag were positively identified by Dr. Mangelson
as belonging to him and removed from his office the night
of November 1 or early morning hours of November 2,
prior to his notification of the break-in.
11: r:ni; given pmsuit

Appellant and the other juvenile occupant were taken
into custody by Officer Murdock and returned to the
Payson City Police Office where they were advised of
their constitutional rights and advised they were being
held for burglary of the Nebo Medical Clinic.
In a later inventory of the vehicle that afternoon, the
officer found $24.00 in bills secreted under the dashboard
in the same denominations (four $5.00 bills and four $1.00
bills) as the $24.00 missing from Dr. Mangelson's office.
A hypodermic syringe was also found in the vehicle (R.
10-11).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE POLICE HAD
PROBABLE
CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE IN WHICH
APPELLANT WAS RIDING AND THE OBSERVATION OF ITEMS IN PLAIN VIEW
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEARCH.
Initially, Officer Murdock stopped the car in which
appellant was riding after he saw the car leave the Nebo
Medical Clinic in Payson, Utah, at approximately 3:00 '
a.m. on November 2, 1971. After a routine check, the car
with appellant in it proceeded on its way. Officer Murdock then proceeded to the area around the Nebo Medical
Clinic to make a security check. He found a broken window and an unlocked door in one of the doctor's offices.
A request to stop the car in which appellant was riding
was issued by Officer Murdock.
This request was based upon the officer's personal
knowledge that it was late at night, that a possible burglary had occurred and the appellant was seen in a car
that had been at the Nebo Clinic just a few minutes prior.
The officer's actions were proper and in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3 (Supp. 1971) which provides:

"A peace officer may make an arrest in obed·
ience to a warrant delivered to him; or may, with·
out a warrant, arrest a person:
(1)

presence.

For a public offense committed in his

5

(2) When the person arrested has committed
a felony, although not in his presence.
(3) When he has reasonable cause for believing the person to have committed a public offense, although not in his presence, and there is
reasonable cause for believing tlzat such person
before a warrant can be obtained and served may:

Flee the jurisdiction or conceal himself
to avoid arrest, or
(a)

(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense, or
(c) Injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
(4) When a felony lzas in fact been committed, and he lzas reasonable cause for believing
the person arrested to have committed it.

(5) On a charge, made upon reasonable
cause, of the commission of a felony by the person
arrested.
(6) At night, when there is reasonable cause
to believe tlzat he has committed a felony." (Emphasis added.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U. S. 137 (1925), was confront.ed
with the issue of the search and seizure of an automobile.
The Court stated that the search of an automobile on
probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from
that justifying a search incident to an arrest:
"The right to search and the validity of the
seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest.
They are dependent on the reasonable cause the
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seizing officer has for belief that the contents of
the automobile offend against the law." 267 U
at 159.
·
Reasonable cause or probable cause was defined by
the Court as follows:
If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offense has been
committed, it is sufficient." 267 U. S. at 161.

The principle was reiterated in Chambers v. Maroney,
399 u. s. 42 (1970).
This Court in State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444
P. 2d 519 (1968), adjudicated a case involving the search
of a car driven by the defendant the day after the robbery. This Court stated:
"The question to be answered is whether under the circumstances the search or seizure is one
which fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and
giving due consideration to the rights and interests
of the public, as well as to those of the suspect,
would judge to be an unreasonable or oppressive
intrusion against the latter's rights."
In applying the above standards of Carroll, Cham·
bers, and Criscola to the facts known to Officer Murdock,
there can be no doubt that he had probable cause to believe the car and its occupants may have been involved
in a burglary at the Nebo Medical Clinic.
Officer Murdock radioed a request to have the car
with appellant and the other occupants in it stopped.
Officer Withers of the Provo, Utah, Police Department
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stopped the car as it left the freeway at Provo. The occupants were ordered out of the car and frisked. Officer
Murdock arrived and looked into the car and observed
a flashlight on the front seat and another flashlight on
the floorboard of the driver's side. He then opened the
door and observed a doctor's bag protruding from under
the car seat. An alcohol bottle of the type used by doctors was also partially visible.
Appellant does not claim this evidence to be false,
but alleges it was an unreasonable search. This Court in
State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P. 2d 535 (1964), held
in a case where a police officer viewed items of the type
taken in a burglary on the front seat of defendant's car
that it was not a search. The Court stated:
"No search was necessary for the officer to
find these articles, they being fully disclosed to
his view when he approached the car. Under such
circumstances, where no search is required the
constitutional guaranty is not applicable."
The United States Supreme Court has also held that
the observation of something in plain view is not a search.
United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927). Applying the
doctrine of Lee and Allred to the case at bar, there can
be no doubt that Officer Murdock's actions did not constitute a search. Therefore, there is no justification to
appellant's argument that there was an invalid search
incident to appellant's arrest. Appellant cites Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, ______ U. S. ______ , 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971),
as precedent for his position. The facts of the present
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case ore clearly distinguishable. In Coolidge, the appellant was arrested in his home; his car was in his driveway.
Later, the car was towed to the police station where a
search warrant was obtained. The search was illegal because the search warrant was not issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate. The Court stated that the plain
view doctrine was not applicable to the facts of Coolidge
nor was the plain view doctrine in conflict with the Court's
decision.
POINT II.
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE AT THE
STATION HOUSE FOR INVENTORY PURPOSES WAS PROPER.
Appellant alleges that the search of the car at the
police station was unreasonable. This allegation is meritless.
The United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968), decided the case where peti·
tioner's automobile had been seen leaving the site of a
robbery. The police later impounded the car and searched
it for inventory purposes. The Court held this procedure
was valid. In State v. Criscola, supra, the police im·
pounded the defendant's automobile and this Court in
that case stated:
"When the officers thus became responsible
for the car and its contents, it was in conformity
with ordinary prudence and customary practice,
for the protection of the car owner as well as the

police, for the officers to take an inventory of its
contents. This of course necessarily involves discovery of what the contents were. To suggest
that under those circumstances where the police
had thus come into the possession of personal property which they had reason to believe was connected with a felony, they would have to go and
obtain a warrant to conduct a 'search' and 'find'
that which they already had lawful possession of,
seems completely discordant with reason. Accordingly, there is no reason apparent to us why the
trial court should have rejected the evidence i...11
question as having been obtained by an 'unreasonable' search. It is our opinion that the officers
were not only acting within their rights, but would
have been remiss in their duty if they had not
done what they did in taking the evidence and
making use of it together with other evidence in
building the case against the defendant." 444 P.
2d at 519-20.
Under the Criscola and Harris rulings, the search for
inventory practices at the police station was clearly valid.
In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States
in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, held that where police
officers had probable cause to stop a vehicle, a search of
the car later at the station house was not improper. Coolidge, supra, noted that the doctrine announced in Chambers was valid in such cases. Therefore, according to
either theory, the police acted properly in its actions.
Appellant cites the case of State v. Richards, -----Utah ______ , 489 P. 2d 442 (1971), as being contradictory
to the holdings of Harris and Chambers.
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This Court in State v. Richards held:
" . . . that the warrantless seizure of defendant's truck parked across the street from his
home, at the time of his arrest in his home was
unreasonable. Officers' justification for the seizure
was the belief that it was involved in another
crime; however, the record was devoid cf facts or
circumstances to support the belief and therefore
was unreasonable and did not support a finding of
probable cause.
"This court ... distinguished that case from
Chambers, supra, on the facts and the issue of
probable cause but did note that a vehicle as in
Chambers could be searched on the spot or at the
station house because the probable cause factor
and the mobility of the car still existed." 489 P.
2d at 424.
Appellant also cites Preston v. United States, 376
U. S. 364 (1964), as being applicable to the case at bar.
In Preston, the arrest was for vagrancy. It was apparent
that the officers had no cause to believe that evidence of
an unrelated crime was concealed in the defendant's automobile. The facts of the case at bar distinguish it from
Preston on the basis that there was probable cause t.-0
stop the car; no search was initially involved and a burglary had just occurred in which appellant was suspect.
Appellant's contentions are meritless and the police
actions were in accordance with applicable statutory and
case law.
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POINT III.
THE APPELLANT WAS IN JOINT POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY
AND NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION
WAS GIVEN BY APPELLANT FOR HIS
POSSESSION.
This Court in the case of State v. Brooks, 101 Utah
584, 126 P. 2d 1044 (1942), adjudicated a case where
property was found in appellant's truck shortly after a
theft. This Court stated:
"If property is in one's technical possession,
implied possession by being found on one's person
or property, but such person is unaware that the
article is on his person or property, he does not
have a possession as is covered by the statute. The
question of his knowledge, of his consciousness of
possession, where denied, is for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances. . . ."
126 P. 2d at 1046.
The Court further stated that in addition to possession, " [t] here must be one more element, failure of defendant to make a satisfactory explanation of that possession." Id.
These elements were clarified even further in State
v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379, 199 P. 2d 155 (1948), wherein
the defendants were charged with the theft of a 1947
Dodge. The question this Court had to decide was
whether the defendants were in possession of the car. The
Court found the defendants jointly guilty of larceny and
stated:

"Many c?nvicti?ns
the crime of larceny
have been affmned m tlus Court when there has
not been any evidence connecting the defendant
with the theft apart from his possession of the
stolen goods. The legislature has said that such
possession, if not reasonably explained is sufficient
to support such a conviction. Inasmuch as the
State in this case offers no testimony directly connecting the defendants with a felonious taking or
asportation the only basis upon which the conviction may be upheld is upon the theory that defendants were in possession of recently stolen
property and failed to make a satisfactory explanation." 199 P. 2d at 156-7.
In 1952, this Court in State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639,
244 P. 2d 653 (1952), considered the case wherein the
defendant was charged with burglary and failed to satisfactorily explain his possession of recently stolen items.
This Court found the defendant guilty and stated:
"Concerning the crime of burglary, we have
no statute such as Section 103-36-1, U. C. A. 1943
which makes possession of recently stolen property, coupled with an unsatisfactory explanation
thereof, prima facie evidence of guilt of larceny.
However, where the larceny must have been committed in connection with a burglary the logic is
the same in regard to burglary. In the case of
Gransbury v. State, 64 Okl. Cr. 408, 81 P. 2d 874,
876, the court said:
'Burglary is one degree removed from larceny; but when the facts in evidence warrant
the finding of the larceny, and the surround·
ing circumstances are such as to show that the
larceny could not have been committed with·
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out the burglarious entry, the evidence is sufficient to warrant the finding of the burglary
also.'" (Citations omitted.) 244 P. 2d at 654.
The Cou:'t further added:
"According to the foregoing authorities, in
order for the defendant's possession of recently
stolen property to be sufficient to suppmi a conviction of burglary, such possession must be recent, that is, not too remote in point of time from
the crime, personal, exclusive, (although it may
be joint if definite) distinct, conscious, and such
possession must be coupled with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other incriminating circumstances or conduct as hereinabove mentioned. And
if these conditions are met a case sufficient to sustain a conviction is made out." (Emphasis added.)
244 P. 2d at 655.
The above rulings have been reiterated in at least
two other burglary cases before the Utah Supreme Court.
See State v. :Manger, 7 Utah 2d 1, 315 P. 2d 976 (1957);
State v. Kirhman, 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P. 2d 638 (1967).
Appellant, Rondo Eastmond, was in joint possession
of property that was stolen the same night of his apprehension. His explanation regarding such property and
of his presence near the scene of the burglary was unsatisfactory, and when considered in the light of all of the
circumstances established by the evidence clearly provides a sufficient connection between the possession of
the stolen property and the burglary and justified the
conclusion by the Court, as the finder of fact, that Rondo
Eastmond did participate in the burglary (R. 10-11).
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CONCLUSION
Officer Murdock clearly had reasonable cause to believe that the occupants of the 1964 Ford vehicle had
committed the burglary and to seize articles in plain view
in the vehicle at the time he placed the adult, David
Groneman, under arrest and took the respondent and
another juvenile into custody. The incriminating articles
found in this manner were admissible in evidence and
such admission did not violate appellant Eastmond's constitutional rights.
Appellant Eastmond at no time alleges in his brief
that he did not comm.it the crime. He was in joint possession of recently stolen property and he failed to make
a satisfactory explanation of that possession.
Therefore, his allegations are erroneous and the lower
court's decree should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

